Operation HYDRA: Joint Canadian-Afghan force clears insurgents from Panjwayii villages
By Captain Lena Angell
Related Information
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Feature Story - December 07, 2009
Villagers greet Afghan National Army soldiers partnered with the 1 PPCLI Battle Group at the edge of one of two villages targeted by Operation HYDRA. The operation includes integrated and fully partnered counter-insurgency security operations by Canadian, Afghan and allied forces to protect local development efforts and provide a more persistent and reliable security presence.
Soldiers of the 1st Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group and the Afghan National Army conduct a joint operation named Operation HYDRA. The mission calls for the clearance of insurgents from the villages of Hajji Baba and Nakhonay.
From left, inside the circle: Hajji Baran, Panjwayii District Leader (black turban), LCol Sakhi Mohammad Barriz, commander of 2/1/205 ANA, and LCol Jerry Walsh, commander of the 1 PPCLI BG, discuss security concerns raised by more than 40 elders who More than 40 elders attended a high-ranking shura the day following the arrival of Afghan and Canadian forces.
At daylight on 15 November 2009, a joint Canadian-Afghan force launched a major operation to clear insurgents out of the Panjwayii District villages of Hajji Baba and Nakhonay. With Lieutenant-Colonel Jerry Walsh in command of the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Light Infantry (1 PPCLI) Battle Group, with some 1,000 soldiers, and more than 200 Afghan soldiers, Operation HYDRA was one of the largest operations Canadians have launched in their four years in Kandahar Province.
Hajji Baba and Nakhonay (estimated combined population 2,000) were pivotal to the insurgency — Hajji Baba as a forward staging area and logistics node, and Nakhonay as a command and control node. Surveillance showed that most of the residents had fled to Kandahar City; only the poorest remained to face typical insurgent intimidation methods such as threatening night letters, curfews and denial of services such as water and medical clinics. The abandoned schools in both villages had been converted to insurgent use.
Only a few shots were fired during Operation HYDRA — not unusual, as insurgents prefer not to confront International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops. Instead, they blend into the local population and use improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which kill 10 times as many Afghan civilians as coalition or Afghan soldiers. Insurgents rarely admit to civilian casualties, even in the face of overwhelming evidence.
As the partnered Canadian-Afghan forces moved into the northern fringe of Hajji Baba, they found several IEDs that required slow, thorough remedial action. “We proceeded with extreme caution and we were meticulous with our clearance. This operation was not based on time; we were not going to rush into Haji Baba,” said LCol Walsh.
“Working with the Afghan national security forces was incredibly beneficial, as they have almost a sixth sense when it comes to locating IEDs,” the battle group commander explained. “It’s their country, and they can tell who is a local and who is acting suspiciously. Sometimes it’s through their dialect, their facial features or the manner in which they dress.”
Chief Warrant Officer Shawn Stevens, the battle group’s Regimental Sergeant Major, agreed. “Because they know this environment, [Afghan soldiers] are naturally more attuned to picking out the indicators that indentify a potential insurgent,” he said.
As elements of the Battle Group reached the outskirts of Hajji Baba, they were met by a crowd of locals. “This is exactly what we were hoping would happen,” said LCol Walsh. “We wanted to be invited into the village, vice impose ourselves on the locals. Once we met, a shura — a traditional Afghan meeting — was called and occurred the following day.”
“The response from the locals was very re-assuring. They were happy to see the [Afghan] and coalition forces, in particular Canadians, come to their village; they welcomed us in and they started to point out where the Taliban had emplaced IEDs,” he went on. “They were quite relieved that we came in wanting to talk, vice point guns, although we were certainly well prepared and ready for anything.”
More than 40 elders who attended the shura said that one of their chief concerns was Taliban infiltration into their village.
Lieutenant-Colonel Sakhi Mohammad Barriz, commanding officer of the 2nd Kandak of 1 Brigade 205 Corps Afghan National Army (2/1/205 ANA), addressed the crowd. “The ANA are here to serve you, the people of Hajji Baba and Nakhonay. The ANA will never place material demands like food and shelter upon you like the Taliban,” he said. “Co-operation between the ANA, the Battle Group and the villagers will be paramount. We, the ANA and the Battle Group, have worked very closely during this operation and we share the same aim: to build civilian infrastructure and improve the welfare of average Afghans in Panjwayii.”
“Lieutenant-Colonel Barriz is an honourable man, and whatever you and I can do from our side to help must be done,” said Panjwayii District Leader Hajji Baran, who went on to reinforce the intentions of the Canadian task force and the Afghan national security forces. “The Canadian Forces have come to build roads, hospitals and schools; the ANA are our brothers and sons, and they are here to help the villagers and to serve them,” he said. “The Taliban, in contrast, have come to destroy the schools so that the children cannot be educated.”
The 1 PPCLI Battle Group and their ANA partners worked slowly and deliberately for nearly a week to clear the village of IEDs. Canadian and Afghan soldiers worked in the village and the surrounding countryside, wherever evidence of insurgent activity was observed, while other elements of the battle group moved south and west to Nakhonay.
As in Hajji Baba, the advance into Nakhonay was peaceful and, as soon as they entered the village, the Canadian and Afghan soldiers began presence patrols to meet the villagers. They also continued to discover and clear IEDs.
Although the push into Hajji Baba and Nakhonay was met with minimal insurgent resistance, the true success of this operation will be measured next summer, when the insurgents do not return — cannot return — because a capable protective force is in place. The persistent presence of partnered Afghan and Canadian troops will create a permissive environment for development and reconstruction.
Nakhonay and Hajji Baba are the most recent communities to become part of the “village approach” to counter-insurgency introduced to the Canadian area of operations in the spring of 2009. Conducted under Operation KALAY, the village approach means clearing the insurgents out of an area village by village, each time leaving troops in place to prevent the insurgents from returning. With the protective force in place, development work can start, ranging from quick-impact infrastructure projects to long-term major efforts co-ordinated by the Canadian International Development Agency.
The village approach is succeeding in Deh-e-Bagh and Belanday, the Dand District communities where it began. IEDs strikes are dropping significantly, and commerce is coming back.
“We — and by that I mean the [Afghan national security forces] and us — will stay in Hajji Baba and Nakhonay through the winter and into the spring,” said LCol Walsh. “It takes time to go into an area and build those trusted relationships because you have to prove to the people that you are genuine in what you say you will deliver. We need to show resolve, to build that trust. That’s how you defeat an insurgency. Also, because the Taliban blend into the local population, in turn it also takes time for us to learn who we can trust. Rebuilding villages in an environment that has known war for 30 years is a delicate process because you are essentially rebuilding faith, belief and most importantly, hope for a better future.”
Capt Lena Angell is the deployed Public Affairs Officer supporting the 1 PPCLI Battle Group and the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team.


